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Abstract
Voter registration among youth is a worldwide phenomenon that exhibits a
notorious decline over the last two decades. In that regard, this paper presents
evidence related to the variables that determine the decision of voter registration
among young population from the Biobio region, the second most populated Chilean
region. A random-effects Tobit model is estimated using electoral and socioeconomic
data from 54 municipalities and 10 planning territories of the Biobio region. The
results indicate that the main determinants of voter registration among youth are
real income, civic engagement, poverty rate, and ethnic population. In particular,
the positive effect of civic-participation rate is higher among male population. The
evidence further suggests the existence of a class-biased electorate and an increasing
electoral apathy among indigenous people in the Biobio region. Finally, latest elections
seemed to encourage a greater political involvement among youth, which outlines a
promising scenario for Chilean democracy’s legitimacy.
Keywords: compulsory voting, voting behavior, Latin America, Chile
JEL Codes: C23, D72, O10, R10
∗This research used data from the household survey of National Socioeconomic Characterization
(CASEN); therefore, the author would like to thank the Ministry of Social Development of Chile, which
is the copyright owner of the survey. Thanks are also due to Juan E. Toledo, Regional Head of the Electoral
Service (SERVEL Biobio). All results are author’s responsibility and they do not compromise neither the
Ministry of Social Development nor SERVEL.
1 Introduction.
Around the world, the evolution of youth vote has shown a decline in its participation rate,
particularly in economies with a voluntary voting rule. In France, the proportion of non-
registrants was 11.3% in 1983 against 10% in 2001. Nevertheless, the French abstention-rate
rose from 21.6% to 32.7% over the same period (Pan Ke Shon, 2004).
In some Scandinavian countries, such as Finland or Denmark, turnout is higher in the
youngest or first time voters. For instance, in the Danish municipal election of 2009 turnout
was 57% among 18-year-olds, while this figure was 42.6% for 21-years-old population (Wass,
2007; Bhatti et al., 2012).
In the United States, many politicians and scholars have shown concern about low turnout
levels, which has motivated some government efforts to increase participation rate, e.g., the
National voter registration Act of 1993. In fact, in the election of November 2010 just 21%
of citizens aged 18 to 24 attended to polling stations (Brandon, 2012).
On the other hand, in countries with mandatory voting laws, such as Australia, Singapore,
or Brazil, voters have to pay an expensive fine if they do not exercise their civic duty, a policy
which has increased voter turnout (Krasa & Polborn, 2009). In Chile, the share of young
population (i.e., 18-29 years old) in the electoral register has declined from 36% in 1988 to
9.71% in 2005. Moreover, voter registration among youth has experienced a clear reduction
from 90.7% in 1988 to 26.4% in 2005 (Toro, 2007).
The Biobio region, the most populated Chilean region after Metropolitana region, suffers
a similar phenomenon. In fact, the enrollment rate among young population has fallen from
49.9% in 2000 to 20.7% in 2011, a phenomenon that has clearly affected more men than
women. The registration rate for the former has lost 32.1 percentage points, while the latter
has lost 26.5 percentage points in the same period (see Figure 1).
In 2011, the lowest registration-rate for youth vote can be found in those planning territo-
ries1 linked to urban centers, such as Pencopolitano (20.4%), Reconversio´n (19.9%), Chilla´n
(19.3%), and Biob´ıo Centro (14.6%) (see Figure 2).
Since 2011 Chilean youth has been a key starring in the social movement that intends to
lead and establish a reform process in the Chilean education system. On the other hand, Na-
tional Congress of Chile has finally approved, after a long discussion process, a constitutional
reform that establish a new voting rule: automatic enrollment and voluntary voting. These
facts motivate the interest of this paper to focus on the voter registration phenomenon in
the Chilean young population. Therefore, this research aims to generate evidence regarding
1The complete list of municipalities and planning territories of the Biobio region can be found in Appendix
A.
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economic and social factors that determine the decision of voter registration among Chilean
youth, in particular, the inhabitants of the Biobio region.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section presents the methodology
used in the electoral study. Third section discusses the main findings, while a fourth section
concludes.
2 Material and methods.
2.1 Modeling the decision of voter registration.
The literature about voting rationality and voter turnout is based on the pioneer work of
Anthony Downs (1957) and Gordon Tullock in 1967 (cited by Barzel & Silberberg, 1973),
but it was mainly developed in the 1970s. During this decade, the efforts were focused
not only on giving a theoretical framework to these political concepts (Frey, 1971; Stigler,
1972; Barzel & Silberberg, 1973; Tollison & Willett, 1973; Ferejohn & Fiorina, 1974; May
& Martin, 1975), but also on identifying the determinants of voter participation as a social
phenomenom (Silberman & Durden, 1975; Tollison et al., 1975; Settle & Abrams, 1976). On
this basis, the following model aims to give a microeconomic foundation to the decision of
voter registration. The model considers a compulsory voting rule, such as the one prevailing
in Chile, a Latin American democracy.
Suppose that a democratic society allows voluntary voter registration but mandatory
voting. This society is populated by n citizens that have preferences over a consumption
good, xi, which price is given by px. In addition, the available time can be allocated as follows,
each citizen can allocate a proportion hi to work in the labor market and a proportion li to
enjoy leisure. Thus, each individual earns a nominal wage rate, w, after working a proportion
hi of its available time. Leisure time is allocated to costless activities that are linked to civic
participation.
Moreover, each citizen values the democratic institutions or democratic principles, d, that
prevail in the society. In this context, each individual must decide whether or not to be part of
civic life through voter enrollment, which is represented by the variable ri. If the individual
decides to be enrolled in the voter register (i.e., ri = 1), then he (or she) contributes to
strengthening the democratic institutions. However, this decision implies a nominal cost cr,
which summarizes all the costs related to mandatory voting, such as transportation costs or
a fine for not attending to the polling stations. Conversely, if the individual decides not to
be enrolled, then ri = 0.
3
Therefore, each citizen must solve the following problem:
max
{x,l,r}
ui(xi, li, d) subject to:(1)
pxxi + crri ≤ hiw(2)
li + hi = 1(3)
xi ≥ 0; li, hi ∈ [0, 1](4)
Where ui(·) is the utility function for individual i, the equation (2) represents the budget
constraint that faces every individual, and the equation (3) is the available time constraint.
In addition, it is possible to express the budget constraint in real terms as follows:
(5) xi + δri ≤ hiω
Where δ = cr/px is the real cost for being enrolled in the voter register, and ω = w/px is
the real wage.
Moreover, the electoral roll, R, is composed by the sum of those individuals that decided
to be enrolled on, i.e., for whom ri = 1. Also, it is assumed that democratic institutions, d,
is a function of the voter register; that is, d = f(R), where f(·) is a continuous, increasing,
and at least twice differentiable function. Therefore, if the aim is to maximize the common
good, then the problem that has to be solved looks as follows:
max
{x,l,r,d}
n∑
i=1
αi ∗ ui(xi, li, d) s.t.:(6)
n∑
i=1
xi +
n∑
i=1
δri ≤
n∑
i=1
hiω(7)
li + hi = 1(8)
n∑
i=1
ri = R(9)
d ≤ f(R)(10)
xi ≥ 0; d ≥ 0; li, hi ∈ [0, 1](11)
Where αi represents the relative weight of each individual i in the society. Therefore,∑n
i=1 αi = 1.
If λ and µ are the Lagrange multipliers associated to constraints (7) and (10), respectively,
then it is feasible to obtain the following necessary first order conditions:
(12)
∂
∂xi
→ λ = αi∂ui
∂xi
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(13)
∂
∂li
→ λ = αi
ω
∂ui
∂li
∂
∂d
→ µ =
n∑
i=1
αi
∂ui
∂d
(14)
∂
∂ri
→ δλ = µf ′(R)(15)
After combining the above relationships, it is possible to obtain the following optimality
condition:
(16) f ′(R) =
(
δ
ω
) n∑
i=1
∂ui/∂li
∂ui/∂d
= δ
n∑
i=1
∂ui/∂xi
∂ui/∂d
The optimality condition yields the optimal values for x?i , l
?
i , h
?
i r
?
i , d
?, and R?, from
which can be defined the following concepts. The voter registration rate, ν, is given by:
(17) ν =
1
n
n∑
i=1
r?i
The civic participation rate, κ, is defined as follows:
(18) κ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
l?i
Now, suppose that the utility function is additively separable in its three arguments and
its functional form is the following:
(19) ui(xi, li, d) = φ1 lnxi + φ2 ln li + φ3 ln d
In addition, suppose that the democracy function, f(R), has the following functional
form:
(20) d = f(R) =
R2
n
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Therefore, the optimality condition (16) implies the following:
(21)
2R?
n
=
(
δ
ω
) n∑
i=1
φ2
l?i
d?
φ3
If we rearrange condition (21), then it is possible to arrive the following expression:
(22) R? =
n∑
i=1
r?i =
(
2ωφ3
δφ2
) n∑
i=1
l?i
If we divide both sides of expression (22) by the population, n, then the optimal voter
registration rate, ν?, is obtained:
(23) ν? =
(
2ωφ3
δφ2
)
κ?
Where ν? = R
?
n
and κ? = 1
n
∑n
i=1 l
?
i .
If the equation (23) is log-linearized, then it can be obtained the following expression:
(24) ln ν? = ln
(
2φ3
φ2
)
+ ln(ω) + ln(κ?)− ln(δ)
Since ν? and κ? belong to the interval [0, 1], then an empirical relationship, which is
coherent with equation (24), is given by:
(25) ν = α0 + α1 ln(ω) + α2κ+ α3 ln(δ) + η
Where η represents the estimation error.
2.2 The empirical model.
The empirical study was focused on the Chilean Biobio region and considered 54 municipal-
ities and 10 planning territories. The data set was collected from Chilean Electoral Service
(SERVEL), National Institute of Statistics (INE), and National Socioeconomic Characteri-
zation survey (CASEN)2. All these data sources enabled to build a four-period panel for the
years 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009.
2The CASEN survey has been applied since 1985 by Ministry of Social Development, former Ministry of
Planning and known as MIDEPLAN, in order to capture information about the following modules: residents,
education, labor market, income, health, and housing. Also, it includes some emergent topics, such as wealth
and ICT, disability, poverty programs, ethnicity, migration, autobiography, and civic participation.
6
The empirical methodology was based on the model derived in the above subsection,
which is coherent with the empirical model proposed by Silberman & Durden (1975), whom
argued a linear relationship between voter participation and several economic and social
variables.
Since there is not a valid measurement or proxy variable for the real cost of being enrolled
(δ), then this variable has been omitted. Thus, the model was estimated using the panel
data approach in order to obtain robust results (see Wooldridge, 2002). In addition, two
control variables were added: the ethnicity ratio (ethnic) and a dummy variable (ballot)
which takes value of one if an election was held at time t and zero otherwise.
Furthermore, since voter registration rate is a truncated variable in the interval [0,1] or
[0,100], then the model was estimated using the corner solution approach3 in the form of a
two-limit random effects Tobit (2LRET) model, which implies the following empirical model:
(26) ν?i,t =

0 If rj = 0 ∀j = 1, . . . , n
youthvoteit If rj 6= 0 for some j
1 If rj = 1 ∀j = 1, . . . , n
Where ν?it is the youth vote rate in municipality (or planning territory) i at time t, rj the
optimal voter registration decision of a citizen j that belongs to a municipality (or planning
territory) populated by n individuals, and youthvoteit is given by:
(27) youthvoteit = β1 + β2lnwagei,t + β3participi,t + β4ethnici,t + β5balloti,t + ci + ηi,t
On the other hand, the model represented by Equation (27) was estimated again after
replacing variable lnwage by the variable poverty, because a fraction of youth is a full-time
higher education student, still live with their parents, and are not part of the labor market.
Therefore, the poverty-rate variant of the model is given by:
(28) youthvotei,t = β1 + β2povertyi,t + β3participi,t + β4ethnici,t + β5balloti,t + ci + εi,t
The above variables are described as follows:
youthvote: ratio between youth enrolled in the electoral register and youth population (i.e.,
18 to 29-year-olds). In addition, this indicator was computed for the male and female
electorates using available data at SERVEL.
3See Wooldridge (2002, Ch. 16) for further details.
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lnwage: the natural logarithm of average real income in Chilean pesos of 2009. It was
computed using the variable yautaj from the CASEN survey.
poverty: poverty rate for young population.
ethnic: indigenous youth to youth population ratio. The ethnic groups recognized in Chile
are Aymara, Rapa-nui, Quechua, Mapuche, Atacamen˜o, Coya, Kawaskar, Yaga´n, and
Diaguita.
particip: civic participation rate for youth, it includes those activities listed in questions
P18, R18, and T18A, that are included in the CASEN 2000, 2003, and 2009 surveys,
respectively. Since this question was excluded from CASEN 2006 survey, then the gap
for 2006 was filled by its 2003-2009 average.4
ballot: dummy variable, which takes value of one if an election (e.g., presidential, senatorial
and deputies, or mayor) was held at time t, and zero otherwise.
Finally, η and ε represent the idiosyncratic error for both models. Next section develops
the main findings obtained from the model estimates.
3 Main findings and discussion.
The model was estimated for the Biobio region considering a municipal panel and a planning
territory panel. In that regard, the municipality panel included 52 out of 54 municipalities,
because Hualpe´n and Alto B´ıo B´ıo were created on March 13 and April 22 in 2004, respec-
tively. Therefore, these counties were not part of the CASEN survey until its 2006 round.
However, the planning territory panel was not affected after excluding both municipalities,
because they were originally part of Talcahuano and Santa Ba´rbara, respectively. Main
findings are discussed below.
3.1 Results from the average income variant.
The results from the 2LRET estimation under the average income variant are compiled in
Tables 1 and 2. The columns one, two, and three from these tables show the 2LRET results
for municipal electorates, whereas columns four, five, and six the territorial estimates.
At the municipal level, the results indicate that all variables are individually and jointly
significant to explain the voter-registration rate among youth. In particular, civic partici-
pation rate (particip) is significant at the 1% level, which positively affects the registration
4See Ministerio de Planificacion (2000, 2003, 2006, 2009).
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rate in the Biobio region. This indicates that young people committed with several activities
or instances of civic participation are less inclined to exclude themselves from democratic
institutions. On the contrary, the effect of real income (lnwage) is negative and significant,
which is consistent with the “opportunity cost of time” argument highlighted by Settle &
Abrams (1976).
The evidence further suggests differences between men and women inside this age group.
In fact, the positive effect of social capital (particip) and the negative effect of ethnicity
seem to be larger for male youth in the Biobio region (columns 2 and 3, Tables 1 and 2).
At the territorial level, the estimates indicate that civic participation rate is still the
main determinant of youth voter registration in the Biobio region, which impact is higher
than that estimated at municipality level and statistically significant at 1%.
By gender, income effect is still negative for the full, male, and female electorates (columns
4-6, Tables 1 and 2). The evidence also indicates that civic participation rate (particip) has
no effect on female registration rate.
Finally, an impending election, measured by the dummy variable ballot, increases elec-
toral enrollment in about 14 percentage points during the period 2000-2009.
3.2 Results from the poverty rate variant.
Main findings from the poverty rate variant are summarize in Tables 3 and 4. The columns
one through three from these tables show the 2LRET results for municipal electorates,
whereas columns four through six the territorial estimates.
At the municipal level, the estimates confirm previous findings. That is, all variables
are individually and jointly significant to explain the voter-registration rate among youth.
In particular, the voter registration rate is positively affected by the civic participation rate
(particip), which coefficient is larger than that estimated in the average income variant.
Regarding the poverty rate, these findings suggest the existence of a class-biased elec-
torate in the Biobio region. In fact, the evidence shows that counties that exhibit lower
levels of social inclusion tend to participate more in politics, which is in line with the nega-
tive income-effect previously reported. Moreover, the poverty effect is larger among young
women.
At the territorial level, the estimates confirm that civic participation rate is a transversal
determinant of youth voter registration in the Biobio region. That is, the estimated param-
eters for the variable particip are statistically significant at the 10% level and their highest
magnitude can be observed in the full and male panels.
On the other hand, the results suggest that Biobio’s ethnic population is reluctant to be
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enrolled in the electoral register, especially female population (column 6, Table 4).
By gender, the main determinants of female voter registration are the civic participation
(particip), ethnicity rate (ethnic), and an impending election (ballot).
Finally, the variable ballot seems to have a significant impact on the phenomenon un-
der study, which positive effect is smaller than previous estimates from the average-income
variant.
4 Concluding remarks.
Youth apathy toward participating in a democratic system is a local and global concern that
deserves the attention of authorities, public, and academic community. In that regard, the
current empirical research aimed to identify the structural variables that influence the voter
registration rate of Chilean youth, in particular, the inhabitants of the Biobio region. Thus,
from the application of the proposed methodological approach, it is possible to arrive to the
following conclusions.
For the municipalities of the Biobio region, the estimates suggest that the main deter-
minants of voter registration among youth are real income, civic engagement, poverty rate,
and ethnic population. The negative effects related to real income and ethnic population
are further consistent with classical literature on voting behavior (Silberman & Durden,
1975; Settle & Abrams, 1976), suggesting the existence of a class-biased electorate and an
increasing electoral apathy among indigenous people in the Biobio region.
For the planning territories, the results are similar to those highlighted above. However,
after including the poverty rate in the model, the estimated effects of civic participation rate
are higher than those originally reported, especially among male population.
On the other hand, there is strong evidence to claim that an electoral process has in-
creased the rate of voter registration during the last decade within the Biobio region. This
finding envisages a promising scenario for Chilean democracy’s legitimacy, because latest
elections (i.e., mayor, deputies and senators, or presidential) seemed to encourage a greater
political involvement among young population, expressing their will regarding the elected
authorities and the political system that prevails in Chile.
In addition, there are some potential limitations. First, there are not available yearly
data for all the economic and social variables, despite it is possible to find them for electoral
variables. Second, the civic participation module was eliminated from CASEN 2006 survey
(Ministerio de Planificacion, 2006). Finally, it is difficult to gather additional disaggregated
information for all the municipalities in order to add new control variables to the empirical
model. Despite the above research limitations, and given the scarce Chilean literature, this
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is a first attempt to address the youth vote phenomenon from a regional perspective that
could be a starting point for future research.
As a final thought, any private initiative or government policy aimed to increase the
political involvement among Chilean youth (e.g., encouraging several instances of civic par-
ticipation) will strengthen the democratic institutions, civic traditions, and social capital
in Chile. Undoubtedly, this will determine the success of the Act 20,568 that instituted a
voluntary voting rule in the Chilean democracy.
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Appendix A List of municipalities classified by plan-
ning territory, Biobio region, Chile.
Planning territories Municipalities Planning territories Municipalities
Valle del Itata Cobquecura Arauco Arauco
Coelemu Can˜ete
Ninhue Contulmo
Portezuelo Curanilahue
Quillo´n Lebu
Quirihue Los A´lamos
Ra´nquil Tiru´a
San Nicola´s
Treguaco Chilla´n Chilla´n
Pencopolitano Chiguayante Laja-Diguill´ın Bulnes
Concepcio´n Chillan Viejo
Hualpe´n El Carmen
San Pedro de la Paz Pemuco
Talcahuano Pinto
Tome´ San Ignacio
Penco Yungay
Secano Interior (AMDEL) Cabrero B´ıo B´ıo Centro Laja
Florida Los A´ngeles
Hualqui Nacimiento
San Rosendo
Santa Juana B´ıo B´ıo Cordillera Antuco
Yumbel Alto B´ıo B´ıo
Mulche´n
Reconversio´n Coronel Negrete
Lota Quilaco
Quilleco
Punilla Coihueco Santa Ba´rbara
N˜iquen Tucapel
San Carlos
San Fabia´n
Source: Unidad de Gestio´n de Informacio´n Territorial (UGIT), Regional Government of Biobio
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Figure 1: Voter registration-rate for young population (ages 18 to 29), Biobio region, period
2000-2011.
Source: Electoral Service and National Institute of Statistics, Chile
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Figure 2: Voter registration-rate for young population (ages 18 to 29), planning territories
of Biobio region, years 2000 and 2011.
Source: Electoral Service and National Institute of Statistics, Chile
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Table 1: 2LRET results for municipalities and planning territories under the average income
variant
Municipal electorates Territorial electorates
Full Male Female Full Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: youthvote
constant 2.5347∗∗∗ 2.3283∗∗∗ 2.2415∗∗∗ 4.3171∗∗∗ 3.5646∗ 2.8348∗∗
(0.7416) (0.6174) (0.3427) (1.2277) (1.6971) (0.9495)
lnwage -0.1893∗∗∗ -0.1739∗∗∗ -0.1618∗∗∗ -0.3394∗∗∗ -0.2773∗ -0.2171∗∗
(0.0585) (0.0493) (0.0277) (0.0818) (0.1325) (0.0756)
particip 0.4973∗∗∗ 0.5365∗∗∗ 0.3116∗∗ 0.5482∗∗ 0.5671∗ 0.4324
(0.1616) (0.1136) (0.1414) (0.1810) (0.3005) (0.2704)
ethnic -0.4402∗∗∗ -0.4399∗∗∗ -0.2854∗∗ -0.9324∗∗∗ -0.9049 -0.6021∗
(0.1439) (0.1654) (0.1179) (0.2813) (0.6407) (0.2757)
ballot 0.1554∗∗∗ 0.1617∗∗∗ 0.1463∗∗∗ 0.1467∗∗∗ 0.1407∗∗∗ 0.1400∗∗∗
(0.0119) (0.0140) (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0263) (0.0162)
No. of obs. 208 208 208 40 40 40
No. of groups 52 52 52 10 10 10
Left-censored obs. 0 0 0 0 0 0
Right-censored obs. 2 4 3 0 0 0
F statistic 59.78 45.28 32.53 37.86 12.06 40.29
Note: Standard jackknife errors in parentheses. * 10% significance; ** 5% significance, *** 1% significance.
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Table 2: Conditional marginal effects for municipalities and planning territories under the
average income variant
Municipal electorates Territorial electorates
Full Male Female Full Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnwage -0.1859∗∗∗ -0.1678∗∗∗ -0.1576∗∗∗ -0.3394∗∗∗ -0.2772∗∗ -0.2170∗∗∗
(0.0583) (0.0486) (0.0274) (0.0846) (0.1331) (0.0772)
[12.075] [12.141] [11.911] [12.163] [12.233] [12.026]
particip 0.4882∗∗∗ 0.5177∗∗∗ 0.3036∗∗ 0.5482∗∗∗ 0.5670∗ 0.4323
(0.1576) (0.1083) (0.1378) (0.1813) (0.3004) (0.2683)
[0.286] [0.319] [0.254] [0.263] [0.294] [0.231]
ethnic -0.4322∗∗∗ -0.4245∗∗∗ -0.2781∗∗ -0.9324∗∗∗ -0.9047 -0.6019∗∗
(0.1411) (0.1587) (0.1155) (0.2674) (0.6431) (0.2743)
[0.042] [0.040] [0.044] [0.033] [0.035] [0.031]
ballot 0.1518∗∗∗ 0.1550∗∗∗ 0.1418∗∗∗ 0.1467∗∗∗ 0.1406∗∗∗ 0.1399∗∗∗
(0.0115) (0.0127) (0.0147) (0.0148) (0.0262) (0.0161)
[1] [1] [1] [1] [1] [1]
Note: Standard error in parentheses and mean values in brackets. * 10% significance,
** 5% significance, *** 1% significance.
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Table 3: 2LRET results for municipalities and planning territories under the poverty rate
variant
Municipal electorates Territorial electorates
Full Male Female Full Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: youthvote
constant 0.1167∗∗∗ 0.0995∗∗ 0.1778∗∗∗ 0.0667 0.0145 0.0635
(0.0363) (0.0448) (0.0391) (0.0740) (0.0596) (0.0746)
poverty 0.4013∗∗∗ 0.3353∗∗ 0.4391∗∗∗ 0.3360 0.6034 0.5829
(0.0979) (0.1359) (0.0974) (0.3068) (0.4382) (0.3897)
particip 0.5923∗∗∗ 0.6481∗∗∗ 0.3676∗∗∗ 0.7763∗∗∗ 0.6726∗ 0.4999∗
(0.1162) (0.1008) (0.1325) (0.1796) (0.3480) (0.2573)
ethnic -0.4362∗∗ -0.4119∗∗ -0.2863∗ -1.2238∗∗ -1.0388 -0.7531
(0.1796) (0.1828) (0.1463) (0.4159) (0.6874) (0.4264)
ballot 0.1416∗∗∗ 0.1559∗∗∗ 0.1256∗∗∗ 0.1162∗∗∗ 0.1198∗∗∗ 0.1055∗∗∗
(0.0119) (0.0151) (0.0130) (0.0172) (0.0304) (0.0118)
No. of obs. 208 208 208 40 40 40
No. of groups 52 52 52 10 10 10
Left-censored obs. 0 0 0 0 0 0
Right-censored obs. 2 4 3 0 0 0
F statistic 69.52 39.60 43.57 31.81 20.46 54.72
Note: Standard jackknife errors in parentheses. * 10% significance; ** 5% significance, *** 1% significance.
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Table 4: Conditional marginal effects for municipalities and planning territories under the
poverty rate variant
Municipal electorates Territorial electorates
Full Male Female Full Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
poverty 0.3923∗∗∗ 0.3224∗∗ 0.4253∗∗∗ 0.3358 0.6028 0.5824
(0.0977) (0.1336) (0.0957) (0.3099) (0.4402) (0.3959)
[0.277] [0.251] [0.303] [0.261] [0.235] [0.287]
particip 0.5789∗∗∗ 0.6231∗∗∗ 0.3560∗∗∗ 0.7759∗∗∗ 0.6719∗ 0.4996∗∗
(0.1131) (0.0953) (0.1281) (0.1758) (0.3453) (0.2509)
[0.286] [0.319] [0.254] [0.263] [0.294] [0.231]
ethnic -0.4264∗∗ -0.3961∗∗ -0.2773∗ -1.2231∗∗∗ -1.0378 -0.7526∗
(0.1755) (0.1753) (0.1422) (0.4037) (0.6817) (0.4223)
[0.042] [0.040] [0.044] [0.033] [0.035] [0.031]
ballot 0.1378∗∗∗ 0.1488∗∗∗ 0.1211∗∗∗ 0.1161∗∗∗ 0.1196∗∗∗ 0.1053∗∗∗
(0.0114) (0.0134) (0.0123) (0.0171) (0.0303) (0.0117)
[1] [1] [1] [1] [1] [1]
Note: Standard error in parentheses and mean values in brackets. * 10% significance,
** 5% significance, *** 1% significance.
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